Between Assyria and the Mediterranean World: the Prosperity of Judah and Philistia in the Seventh Century BCE in Context

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The kingdom of Judah and the Philistine cities along the coast experienced unparalleled economic prosperity during the seventh century BCE. This is evident from the surge of settlement in the fringe areas of the Negev and the Judean desert, and from the large production and trade centres unearthed around Jerusalem and at Ekron and Ashkelon. The discovery of Judahite wheat in Ashkelon, together with other available archaeological evidence of trade and the local geographical conditions, enable us to reconstruct the well-integrated economy of the region in the seventh century, and to re-examine its role within the period’s larger economic structures. After presenting the evidence regarding the economic system of Judah and Philistia in the seventh century BCE, the paper will reconstruct the function of this ‘local’ system within the larger ‘world’ system, and will re-examine the role of the Assyrians, Phoenicians and Egyptians in its creation.

Economy and Settlement Patterns in the Seventh Century

We shall begin with a short review of the finds in Philistia and this will be followed by discussion of the finds in Judah.

Philistia and the Coast

Settlement Patterns

As far as settlement patterns are concerned, the seventh century saw a great increase in settlements along the coast, and the general settlement patterns of ancient Israel began to shift toward this region – a tendency even more pronounced during the Persian period (e.g. Finkelstein 1988–1989, 55; Stern 1994a, 131–132; 2001, 428; Aharoni 1979, 415; Faust and Safrai forthcoming).
This settlement growth can be seen in the results of the surveys that have been conducted along the coastal plain and its margins, as well as of the excavation of many new sites that were established or re-established at the time, e.g. Mikhmoret (Porat, Paley and Stieglitz 1993), Tel Qasile (Mazar 1985, 128), Tel Michal (Singer-Avitz 1989, 86–87), Mezad Hashavyahu (Naveh 1960; 1962; Fantalkin 2001), the Haserim of the southern coastal plain (Gophna 1963; 1964; 1970), etc., and in the foundation of sites in some micro-regions that were never settled before, such as the foothills of Samaria (Finkelstein 1978; 1981; Faust 2006).

The growth along the coast resulted from the growing importance of this region. This area had always served as a land bridge between Mesopotamia/Syria and Egypt, and was of crucial importance, especially when the hegemonic empire had interests in the other end of this road. Maritime trade, conducted mainly by the Phoenicians (e.g. Elat 1990, 83–87; Sherratt and Sherratt 1993; Markoe 2000; Aubet 2001), became more important as the Iron Age progressed and this also had an important impact on settlement patterns along the coast.

Economy and Trade
The finds at several excavated sites in Philistia further exhibit the prosperity of the region:

Ashkelon, the only real coastal city south of Jaffa, was a huge settlement, the excavator estimating the population at 10,000–12,000 inhabitants (Stager 1996, 62). The city was well fortified (ibid.) and participated in international maritime trade as is evidenced by the various imports unearthed at the site (e.g. Masters 2003). The major architectural find, the winery, was a large building whose construction involved ashlars and timber. This structure represents what was probably the main agricultural activity in the area – wine production. According to Stager (1996, 64; more below), “(t)he royal winery at Ashkelon… suggest(s) that coastal Philistia was already an important producer of wine both for local consumption and for export”. Various agricultural products were naturally imported to Ashkelon, whose ‘natural’ hinterland was limited since it was located on the shore of the Mediterranean, and in the midst of sand dunes. Olive oil was probably imported from the Inner Coastal Plain and the Shephelah, while grains were, as Weiss and Kislev (2004) clearly showed, imported from even farther inland, i.e. from Judah, and perhaps also from the Sharon. It is likely that Ashkelon, due to its location, was also an important fishing centre.

Ekron, perhaps the most famous exemplar of the seventh century prosperity, can serve as another example. The site expanded dramatically at the time, reaching a size of more than 75 acres. It was well planned and fortified, and “included industrial, domestic and elite zones of occupation… With only 4 percent of the tell excavated, 115 olive oil installations have been identified, with an annual production capacity of at least 500 tons, making Ekron the largest ancient industrial centre for the production of olive oil excavated to date” (Gitin 1998, 276; see also Eitam 1987; 1996). The small finds include a small number of imports, including many Egyptian artefacts, attributed either to the period of Egyptian rule in the Coastal Plain (Dothan and Gitin 1993,1058), or to booty brought by the Assyrians (Gitin 2003, 59–60, note 6).

Judah
The data from seventh century Judah also seem very instructive.

Settlement Patterns
While much of Judah’s territory in the west was devastated and transferred to Philistine rule following Sennacherib’s 701 campaign, Judah expanded in the seventh century into several regions that were previously under-exploited.

This expansion is most clearly evident in the Judean desert. The entire region east of Jerusalem, through the Judean desert to the Dead Sea shores, was almost empty of settlement earlier in the Iron Age. During the seventh century, however, it suddenly witnessed an unparalleled wave of settlement that includes: Ein Gedi, Rugm el Bahr, Qumran, Khirbet Mazin/Qasr el-Yahud, Ein el Guweir, Ein et-Turaba, the Boqeqah sites, Vered Yericho, and others (for detailed discussion and references, see Stager 1976; Bar-Adon 1989; Stern 1994b; Faust and Weiss 2005; Faust 2008).

This settlement wave is not only a huge increase in comparison to preceding eras, but is also unexpected when it is remembered that we are discussing a semi-arid region. Some of the changes are probably connected to Judah’s attempts to utilize the natural resources of the Dead Sea region, such as bitumen and salt (see Beil Arieh 1997). Others should be explained differently. Finkelstein (1994) suggested that the expansion to the inhospitable regions of Judah was made in order to compensate Judah for the loss of its grain fields in the Shephelah, and we shall return to this issue later.

The second region where settlement expanded significantly is the Beersheba and Arad valleys. Most scholars believe that the number of seventh century sites in this region exceeds that of previous periods (Na’aman 1987; Finkelstein 1994; 1995; but see Tahareani Sussely 2007), and the sites include, for example, Tel Masos, Tel Ira, Aror, Khirbet Uza, Khirbet Radum, Arad, and others (for settlement in the region in the eighth and seventh centuries, see also the detailed discussion in Faust 2008).

The reasons behind this prosperity are debated. A common
view connects the expansion in the Negev with the Arabian trade that stemmed from the Assyrian peace (e.g. Na’aman 1987; 1995, 113), although there is very little direct evidence for this trade. Notably, the Arabian trade, despite its great commercial importance, involved only small-scale loads, and it is unlikely that it alone would cause such a settlement growth. Moreover, the Negev is not a unique phenomenon, and the prosperity in the Judean desert (above) cannot be attributed to the Arabian trade.

This led Finkelstein (1994) to the conclusion that the phenomenon of seventh century desert settlement is connected with Judah’s need for grain. These regions are suitable for the growing of wheat and barley, and according to Finkelstein the Beersheba valley could produce over five-thousand tons of grain per year. This production was, according to him, more than 20 times the needs of the local population (Finkelstein 1994, 177; see also Herzog 1994, 126–27).³

**Economy and Trade**

Other archaeological finds relating to economy and trade present us with even more “direct” evidence for the prosperity that Judah experienced and the international trade in which it participated.

Jerusalem, the capital, exhibits many signs of trade (Faust and Weiss 2005, 75). An analysis of the fish bones found indicates an intensive and well organized trade with the Mediterranean and the southern Coastal Plain (Lernau and Lernau 1992, 136). Shells also indicate trade, and according to Mienis (1992, 129), the shells uncovered “had their origin in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the River Nile,” and “point to an intensive trade between those areas and the inhabitants of the city”. An examination of a small collection of wood remains reveals that about 8 percent were imported from relatively long distances (Liphschitz 1989, 142–43). Several inscriptions might indicate trade with South Arabia (Shiloh 1987), and perhaps even Greece (Sass 1990).

Evidence for trade was also found in other regions. Liphschitz and Biger, for example, have analysed wood remains from the Beersheba and Arad valleys. They found a large amount of cedar in this arid and remote region, concluding: “(t)he high occurrence of cedar in the Negev – 10% of the wood assemblage – indicates the wealth and widespread commercial activities of a regime which was able to use such an expensive import in the building of monumental constructions” (Liphschitz and Biger 1991, 172).

Clearly, the seventh century experienced economic prosperity, much of which was connected with trade. We believe that all the ‘separate’ lines of evidence, or types of finds, can be explained by a single scenario. For this, we will examine the data within their geographical and economic context.

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**The Seventh Century BCE Agricultural Production**

From the data presented above, one can reconstruct several zones of agricultural production.

Ashkelon and the Coastal Plain specialized in growing vines and the production of wine (e.g. Stager 1996, 64; Johnson and Stager 1995). The inner Coastal Plain and the Shephelah grew mainly olives, specializing in olive oil production (Eitam 1987; 1996). Indeed, there is evidence that the Shephelah was used for such purposes in many periods (Drori 1979, 70–72; Amar 1999; see also Baruch 1999, 25).

Further inland, some parts of the highlands, especially the valleys with their heavy soils, are suitable for growing grain (for example, the Soreq valley near Moaza: see e.g. Greenhut 2006), and so is the desert fringe (see e.g. Shmueli 1980, 158–159; Finkelstein 1994) – and therefore able to supply the demands of other regions (other parts of the Judean hill country were devoted to growing vines and also olives). The semi-arid parts of Judah specialized also in herding, supplying herd products to more settled regions (Fig. 15.1).

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**Figure 15.1. Schematic and general map showing the four main circles of land use in Judah and Philistia.**

1 = 1st circle: Vine growing areas
2 = 2nd circle: Olive growing areas
3 = 3rd circle: Cereal growing areas
4 = 4th circle: Grazing
Such “zoning” is expected. After all, the Coastal Plain is well suited for the growing of vines, and hence wine production. The Shephelah is suited for the growing of olives, and hence olive oil production. Some parts of the highlands are suitable for growing grain, and so is the desert fringe. The desert fringe, and even parts of the desert itself, are, of course, also suitable for herding.

Ecological zoning, however, while tempting, falls short of explaining the phenomenon discussed here. For example, the Coastal Plain is also suitable for growing cereals. Why did Ashkelon choose to concentrate on vines and not on wheat? Furthermore, while parts of Judah are suitable for grain, this is not typical of Judah as a whole. Ecologically speaking, Judah is expected to be exporting wine, not wheat. Still, various lines of evidence, in addition to the Judahite wheat unearthed in Ashkelon, indicate that in the late Iron Age Judah was perceived as a grain producing region, perhaps even as the grain basket of the region:

1) **Ezekiel 27** – the lamentation over Tyre. Most scholars agree that the list of Tyre’s trading partners in the passage is authentic and is approximately contemporary with Ezekiel, i.e. it reflects an early sixth (or late seventh) century reality (Wevers 1969, 205; Eichrodt 1970, 387; Cook 1936, 296; see also Greenberg 1997, 556; Diakonoff 1992; Stager 2003). It is therefore interesting that the only supplier of wheat to Tyre is “Judah and the Land of Israel” (verse 17).

2) Elat (1977, 196) notes that the various texts that describe Israel’s relations with Tyre, whatever the historical reality behind them, indicate Israel’s role in the exchange as providing grain.

3) It is also worth mentioning a legal document from Nineveh that mentions wheat sold according to Judahite **Se’ah** (satu) (Elat 1977, 197). This means that wheat from Judah must have been something that people were familiar with.

This is not “expected” ecologically. Also, while the Judean desert and the Negev can produce cereal surpluses, this is not usually the case, and there must have been a serious incentive for this to happen. We believe that the reasons behind the above mentioned patterns lie in larger economical considerations. In order to understand these we need to realize the profitability of the various activities.

**Prices and Profits**

The most widely grown and important crops in ancient Israel were grain (wheat, and to a lesser extent barley), olives and grapes, and to this one should add herding. A comprehensive analysis of the productivity of these crops indicates that, by and large, wine production was the most “profitable” activity in the typical Mediterranean economy. The second most ‘profitable’ crop was olives, and then came grain (e.g. Safrai 1994, 126–128, 355), followed by herding (for a detailed discussion, with references, see also Faust and Weiss 2005, 76–77). Notably, although oil was more expensive than wine (e.g. Dar 1986, 159), a hectare of vines produced much more wine than a hectare of olives produced oil (Faust and Weiss 2005, 76–77 with many references). This difference compensates, and more, for the lower price of wine, and makes the growing of vines more ‘profitable’.

**Profitability and Zones of Production**

When reviewing our four zones of production, in light of their ‘profitability’, it is clear that while the production zones correspond to a large extent with ecological zoning, they are also organized according to profitability, in direct relation to the distance to the sea – the closer the zone is to the sea, the more profitable its typical crop.

The differences in profitability can easily explain why Ashkelon specialized in wine production, and chose to import its wheat – the former was much more profitable. But why did Judah become an important grain producer? After all, grain is located quite low on the ‘profitability scale’. We believe that this can be explained along economic lines, when we examine all four zones as comprising a single economical system.

Various scholars have acknowledged (following von Thünen 1826 [Hall 1966]; see also Chisholm 1979) that location and ‘profitability’, mainly as a combination of the price of the products and land and transportation costs, play a major role in determining the choice of crops for production. According to Wheeler and Muller (1986, 318; emphasis added): “if environment variables are held constant, then the... product that achieves the highest profit will outbid all other products in the competition for location.”. One can therefore expect that the most ‘profitable’ activities will be conducted in the best location, *i.e.* nearer the ‘centres’. The less profitable the activity is, the farther away it is expected to be, as long as this is permitted by the ecological conditions, of course. Similar variation of production zones can cover extensive regions, crossing political boundaries and ecological niches (e.g. Peet 1969; see also Bradford and Kent 1977, 39; De Blij 1977, 303; Thoman, Conkling and Yeates 1968, 161–163; Wheeler and Muller 1986, 326–341).

**Reconstructing the Economy of the Seventh century**

When the above economic considerations are taken into account, along with ecological ones, we believe that all the archaeological data become complementary. The archaeological evidence indicates that the economy of the desert and the highland (Judah), as well as the lowland
(Shephelah) and the Coastal Plain (e.g. Ashkelon) was highly integrated in the seventh century, both within these regions, and with the international maritime trade.

At the heart of the local system was Ashkelon. Being the major port of the south, it was the gate through which desired imports came to the region, and through which commodities were exported. Ashkelon itself must have been a major consumer of commodities for export and food for its own consumption. Located on the coast, in the midst of dunes, Ashkelon could not have supported itself agriculturally, and must have imported most of its food. Forming the ‘best location’, Ashkelon had used its own hinterland mainly, though probably not solely, for the production of wine – the most ‘profitable’ economic activity.

The second zone was in the Inner Coastal Plain and the Shephelah. Here the major product was olive oil, represented by the huge production centre of Ekron. Olive oil, however, was produced at other sites, such as Tel Batash (e.g. Kelm and Mazar 1987; Mazar 1997, 211–218), and even as far north as Tel Hadid (Brand 1998). At the latter site a large industrial area with 25 oil presses was excavated, and it represents another centre of production at the edge of this zone. While the local population probably produced some wine and grain, olive oil production was the major field there. Interestingly, this also explains the somewhat awkward situation of Ekron in relation to the probable location of most of the olive groves. Ekron, as noted for example by Eitam and Shomroni (1987, 49; see also Eitam 1996, 184), is situated on the edge of the olive-growing area, and it therefore seems that it became the major production centre not because of its central location as far as the olive-supplying area was concerned, but because of its proximity to the coast and to Ashkelon.

The third zone was mostly in Judah. Apparently, Judah manufactured surpluses of what the other areas, and especially Ashkelon, needed – grain. We should note that while it is clear that Judah also produced wine and olive oil, as the archaeological evidence clearly indicates (Faust and Weiss 2005, 80–82), this is expected even according to the theoretical model, which acknowledges the existence of secondary centres (with smaller ‘circles’ around them: e.g. Bradford and Kent 1977, 34; see also Fig. 15.1). Still, its contribution to the overall system was grain.

Now we can understand why Judah had expanded into the inhospitable regions of the desert and the desert fringe. Following Finkelstein we believe that this region probably produced grain surpluses; obviously, the limited surpluses of the Judean desert did not go to Ashkelon. These surpluses supplied Jerusalem, but this ‘freed’ other grain producing areas, and those fed Ashkelon.

The fourth zone was grazing, mainly in the Judean desert and the Negev.\(^4\)

We can now understand why Ashkelon grew vines and imported grain, why Ekron produced so much olive oil, and why Judah expanded to the desert. This also explains why cedars were brought to the Negev, and how Judah paid for its fish, etc. All lines of evidence seem, therefore, to converge.

**The Local System and the Greater World**

But what initiated this system? Clearly, Judah and Philistia exported surpluses to another region, and the entire system described here was peripheral to the larger economic system into which it was incorporated.

**Assyria**

The dominant political power in the region during most of the seventh century was Assyria, and it clearly had economic interests in the Levant (e.g. Elat 1990, esp. 83–87; Sherratt and Sherratt 1993; Raban 1998, 433; see also Reich 1984). The common view ascribes the economic prosperity in the region to the Assyrian Peace – pax Assyriaca. Na’aman (1995, 114), for example, wrote: “(t)he prosperity of the southern frontier of the kingdom of Judah is the direct result of the pax Assyriaca and the growth of the Arabian caravan trade that stemmed from the economic activity of the Assyrian empire”. Elsewhere, Naaman (2001, 275) wrote that “(e)conomic considerations played a major role in Assyrian operations in the territories of the vassal kingdoms and pastoral groups…”.

Gitin (1995, 61), the excavator of the oil production centre at Ekron, wrote about the economic prosperity: “(i)t’s genesis was an ideology of empire based on the mercantile interests of the Neo-Assyrian kings…. The policy resulted from the empire’s need for an increasing supply of raw materials and manufactured goods, especially luxury items, as well as for new sources of silver for use as currency. The effect was the formation of a new supernational system of political control in the eastern Mediterranean basin which produced the pax Assyriaca, 70 years of unparalleled growth and development, and an international trading network which spanned the Mediterranean, stimulating Phoenician trade and colonization in the west”. And regarding Ekron, he adds (Gitin 1995, 62): “(t)his huge 7th century B.C.E. city, with its well-developed town plan and industrial centre, resulted from the same Neo-Assyrian interests that produced new urban and commercial centres and a new economic exchange system throughout the Mediterranean basin”. And (Gitin 1995, 63): “(t)he evidence from the 7th century city of Ekron demonstrates the phenomenon that characterized Neo-Assyrian economic policy”, adding (Gitin 1995, 69): “(t)his is a prime example of the innovative Assyrian policy of industrial specialization and
mass production which concentrated large-scale industrial activity in one center” (see also Gitin 1989, 48).

Finkelstein and Ussishkin (2000, 602) also wrote: “it seems that southern Palestine was the focus of Assyrian economic activity in the region, which included the foundation of central emporia and overland trade with Arabia, Transjordan and Egypt”.3

We should therefore stress that our reconstruction of the seventh century economic system is against this consensus (note that others have already rejected the consensus, e.g. Schloen 2001, 141–147; Faust and Weiss 2005; and see also Stager 1996; Na’aman 2003, 81).

Whatever the political status of the region in relation to Assyria when this system flourished, it is clear that the destination of the commodities was elsewhere, and that Assyria did not initiate the prosperity, for the following reasons.

1) First of all, Assyria is too far away for commercial land-transportation, which would simply be far too expensive (from a different perspective, see Machinist 1992, 76). Moreover, the available data on importation of wine to Assyria indicates that it was indeed brought from much nearer locations, and whenever possible was transported by river (see, for example, Liverani 1992, 158, fig. 22; Yamada 2000, 270–271, 416; see also Oppenheim 1967, 244). This is corroborated by the fact that:

2) On the basis of the available evidence it seems that Judah and its neighbours paid tribute to Assyria in ‘exotic’ commodities or items, not in heavy agricultural products (Elat 1978, 30–31; 1991, 21–22; Tadmor 1975, 37; Allen 1997, 187; Schloen 2001, 146–147, note 17; see also Yamada 2000, 265, 414). We have no evidence for the payment of wheat, olive oil or wine by Judah to Assyria. Again, Judah and Philistia were simply too far away for that. Judah and its neighbours used their agricultural surpluses to acquire other commodities, and those were paid as tribute to Assyria.

3) Moreover, and more important, if the Assyrians had an interest in the agricultural products of the region, they could have restored the large oil industry that existed in Samaria and the Galilee during the eighth century BCE (e.g. Gal and Frankel 1992; Eitam 1979; 1980; 1992; Faust forthcoming a). Samaria and the Galilee, unlike Ekron, were Assyrian ‘territories’ (to use Gitin’s [1989, 48] term). Those regions were more suitable for growing olives than the inner coastal plain, and had a longer history of olive oil production during the Iron Age (Eitam 1979; 1980; 1992; Gal and Frankel 1992; Faust forthcoming a).

That they did not rebuild the olive oil industry in Samaria and the Galilee, indicates that the Assyrians were not interested in maximizing productivity in the region, not even in “their” territories.

4) Finally, the above-presented system is no doubt directed toward the Mediterranean world and to its maritime trade, and not toward Mesopotamia. It is centred around Ashkelon and the coast, and ‘has its back’, so to speak, to the north and east (i.e. Samaria and other regions which were closer to Mesopotamia were not part of the system).

**Phoenicia and the Mediterranean World**

There can be no doubt that the Phoenicians had a major role in this trade (e.g. Markoe 2000; Aubet 2001; see also various papers in Bierling 2002). The Phoenician involvement in trade and colonization of the Mediterranean became more and more intensive as the Iron Age progressed. From the early first millennium BCE onward it is clear that they were engaged in trade in various parts of the region, and from the ninth century, or the beginning of the eighth century at the latest, they were involved in colonization in the far western part of the Mediterranean and in intensive trade along its shores and even in the Atlantic (Aubet 2001 and references; see further below). In the seventh century the Phoenicians were at the peak of their commercial success and were responsible for the majority of the maritime trade at the time, including the transportation of commodities to and from Ashkelon, as was recently proved by Master (2003).

Clearly, it was the Phoenician trade that served as an impetus for the development of the economic system discussed here. The Phoenician demand for products was initially influential along the coast, but gradually percolated inland, altering the local economy. This process is (to a limited extent) similar to what happened in other regions, for example in Spain, where the local society was altered by contacts with the Phoenicians (e.g. Aubet 2001; see also Hodos 2006; various papers in Bierling 2002; Delgado and Ferrer 2007). While the Phoenicians conducted this trade, and benefited from it, it is clear that they did not consume all the goods that they transported.

**Egypt**

It is possible that we can identify a more specific economic force, whose needs helped in creating this system. While various Mediterranean regions consumed the surpluses discussed here, it is likely that special attention should be focused on Egypt. The seventh century, and especially its latter half, was a flourishing period in Egypt, from both political and economic perspectives (see e.g. Lloyd 2000, 369–83; Kuhrt 1995, 636–46; Redford 1992, 433–44; see also Markoe 2000, 44–46). Redford (1992, 433) refers to
the 26th (Saite) dynasty as “the last period of imperial and cultural renewal of ancient inspiration ancient Egypt was to experience”. The growing market of Egypt seems to have been the destination of much of the export, and it is possible that it was a prime mover behind development of the local system. Egyptian agriculture does not usually produce the necessary quantities of olives and grapevines – two of the ancient ‘triad’ – hence the need to import these basic products in large quantities. The large needs of the expanding Egyptian market most likely made the production of wine and olive oil so profitable, and caused the changes in the economy of Judah and Philistia (see also Stager 1996, 70–71).

The Mediterranean Economy and Assyria – part 1

Whether or not due to the needs of the expanding Egyptian market, it was the Phoenician trade that made the production of wine and olive oil so profitable, and caused the gradual changes in the economy of Judah and Philistia. The immediate cause of the transformation of the economies of Judah and Philistia was their incorporation within the expanding Mediterranean economic system.

But what was the role of the Assyrians in the creation of the economic system of southern Israel? Assyria – the dominant Mesopotamian empire – no doubt benefited from the prosperity (e.g. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 24–27), and some have suggested that the Assyrians’ demand for tribute forced the Levantine states to look for more sources of income, hence altering the economy (e.g. Sherratt and Sherratt 1993, 366, 370; Hopkins 1997, 29; Bedford 2005, 72–73). Furthermore, it has been claimed that the Assyrians drove the Phoenicians into the Mediterranean and by doing so created the Mediterranean system. Frankenstein (1979, 273), for example, wrote “… the Phoenicians became the main suppliers of primary materials to their Assyrian and other partners in the regional trading system”, adding:

“(i)n order to meet the new demands from within the regional trading system, the Phoenician cities were forced to extend their exchange relations… expansion beyond the regular, established trading network within the Eastern Mediterranean would have been the means by which the Phoenician cities could maintain themselves whilst maintaining their role within the Assyrian dominated regional economy. In fact, the Assyrians’ demands forced the Phoenician cities to become suppliers of raw materials for the production centres of trading partners and in order to obtain these raw materials the Phoenician cities had to enlarge their trading sphere”.

According to this suggestion, the Assyrian demands for tribute forced the Phoenicians to look for more sources of income, and especially of silver, and they actively encouraged the Phoenician colonization of the west. Should this be true, the driving force behind the prosperity in Philistia and Judah would indeed have been the Assyrians. But in contrast to this commonly held view, we think it is clear that Assyria did not initiate the economic prosperity, and was not directly involved in its development.

The system described above evolved outside the boundaries of Assyria; notably, the Assyrian provinces in the west, such as Samaria, were not part of this system, and actually did not prosper at the time. This is despite the fact that during the eighth century BCE this (and the Galilee) was the central area in which olive oil was produced (Eitan 1980; 1992; Gal and Frankel 1992; Faust forthcoming a, with many references); in the seventh century, no large centres for olive oil production existed here, and these regions were still in the shadow of the collapse brought about by the Assyrian campaigns of the late eighth century (see extensive discussion in Faust forthcoming a, forthcoming b).

Furthermore, the impact of Mesopotamia can be seen not only in the relative ‘backwardness’ of Samaria and other provinces in the seventh century, but also in the cessation of the system discussed here, as a result of the activities of Assyria’s successor as the dominant Mesopotamian empire – Babylonia. The Babylonian campaigns in the late seventh and the early sixth century brought an end to this flourishing system (e.g. Stager 1996; Stern 2001; see also Faust forthcoming b). After those campaigns the entire system was in ruin, and did not participate in the flourishing Mediterranean trade of the sixth century BCE. This is evident not only from the conflagrations unearthed at practically all sites (Stager 1996; Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2001, 282; Gitin 1995, 74–75; 1998, 276; Stern 2001; Faust forthcoming b, with many references), but also by the almost complete lack of imported Greek pottery throughout the region in the sixth century (e.g. Weinberg 1969, 78, 89–90; Boardman 1999, 52; Stern 2001, 344; Waldbaum 2003, 301–302; Fantalkin 2006, 204).

Clearly, the prosperity was always beyond Assyria’s (or Babylonia’s) advancing frontiers in the Levant. Once a prosperous area was incorporated within the boundaries of the empire, usually following conquests and destructions, it was in relative ruin and its economy was weak and of a local nature at best. Notably, as has been pointed out by many, the Assyrians were not interested in manipulating the economy – only in extracting wealth (e.g. Postgate 1979, 214; Schloen 2001, 146; Grayson 1991, 216).

Another point to bear in mind when considering the role of Assyria in the development of the Mediterranean economy is that the international maritime trade started long before the
Assyrian empire had a foothold on the Mediterranean coast. While the dates of the initial Phoenician colonization of the west were debated until recently, it is quite clear today that Phoenician trade started in the early first millennium BCE (e.g. at Kition; Aubet 2001, 51–52), and, furthermore, it is quite certain that the Phoenicians reached as far as Iberia as early as “the first half of the 9th century BCE if not before” (Nijboer and van der Plicht 2006, 31, 35–36; see also Gonzalez de Canales, Serrano and Llompart 2006; for further discussion and additional dates from Spain in the ninth century, see Aubet 2001, 372–381; Nijboer 2004, 539). Carbon 14 dates from Carthage also seem to date the initial Phoenician settlement there to the later part of the ninth century BCE (Nijboer 2004, 536–537; Docter et al. 2004; Docter et al. 2006; Nijboer and van der Plicht 2006, 33–35). It is quite clear, therefore, that the Phoenician expansion westward started long before the Assyrian hegemony in Phoenicia was established, and that it cannot be a result of Assyrian policy.

We shall re-evaluate Assyria’s role in the Mediterranean system later on, but in the meantime we should note that all the above has some clear implications for our understanding of the nature of the Assyrian involvement in Judah and Philistia, and we believe the role of the former has been exaggerated recently.

**Intermediate Summary**

We have clear evidence for prosperity in Philistia and Judah during the seventh century BCE, both in terms of settlement expansion and evolving trade. Although politically the region was part of the Assyrian world, this economic prosperity was connected with the new economic system that evolved in the Mediterranean world during the first centuries of the first millennium BCE. The Assyrians no doubt benefited from the prosperity, but the economic driving force behind this development was the Phoenicians, and probably also the awakening economic giant of Egypt.

The lively Mediterranean system was developing long before Assyrian control over the region could create the demand, and it later influenced production in the coastal areas. The changes gradually trickled inland and eventually also had an impact on the agricultural production in more inland parts of the country – but only in those that were not conquered and ruined by the Assyrians, including the Judean highlands, the Negev and the desert fringe, and perhaps even in parts of southern Transjordan. This impact integrated the entire region into one economic system, which was part of the larger Mediterranean economic system.

**Judah, Philistia and the Seventh Century World-System**

And how is this all related to ‘world-systems’? We cannot, of course, do justice to the world-system theory here, but a few introductory words are in order. The world-system paradigm was developed by Wallerstein (1974), and was later followed and elaborated by many others (for introductions to the world-system theory, see also Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991; 1995; 1997; 1998; Hall and Chase-Dunn 1996, and many references). As Seymour-Smith (1986, 291) summarized, Wallerstein defined the world-system as:

“… A social system based on an international division of labour mediated through trade exchanges without the need for a unified political structure. This system creates ‘core’, ‘periphery’ and ‘semiperiphery’ with differential participation in the overall economy and with differing internal class and economic organization”

Although definitions vary greatly, cores (in the classic sense) are usually supposed to accumulate surpluses, produce items for trade using skilled labour and sophisticated technology and have a strong political organization (Peregrine 1996: 3, and references). Peripheries are viewed as being suppliers of raw materials produced using unskilled labour and ‘primitive’ technology, having weak political organization and consuming products manufactured in the core (ibid.). Semi-peripheries act as middle-men in trade between core and periphery, form a political buffer-zone, limiting conflict between core and periphery and producing a few items using simpler technology brought from the core (Peregrine 1996, 4). Another concept is that of ‘margins’, which relates to regions that are remote, unaffected, and “disengaged from processes of struggle and competition, differentiation, and specialization in relation to much older and more developed centres of civilization” (Schneider 1977, 21; see also Sherratt 1993, 6)

First of all, we believe it was a simplistic perception of the world-system theory that led to the understanding that Philistia, as a periphery of the Assyrian core, must have sent its products (raw materials) there (for the, usually indirect, impact of the world-system theory on studies of relations between regions, see e.g. Frankensteijn 1979; Allen 1997; Gitin 1997). While not a fault of the theory, its initial impact was, in our view, somewhat misleading. We should note that while we find a ‘world-system approach’ (or perspective; Peregrine 1996, 1) to be of importance and helpful (and it indeed helped in understanding the system reconstructed
above), the ‘world-system theory’ (or theories) might be too limiting, and at times even confusing (given the various ‘theories’ and ‘corrections’ and the ongoing debates) or at least not always helpful. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the use of the world-system theory/perspective, and in light of the above we will not attempt to suggest a new reconstruction of the system and its components. We would like, however, to mention one point about the system which we find disturbing, and which might therefore be worthwhile and productive to pursue.

All attempts to explain the reality during the seventh century BCE viewed, as we have seen above, the Assyrian empire as the core of the system (e.g. Allen 1997; Frankenstein 1979; see also Gitin 1997). What we believe is more difficult is to define the other components of the system. Simply put, several scholars have convincingly suggested that while Assyria was the core of the seventh century world system, Phoenicia/the Levant was a semi-periphery (i.e. one of the “important gateway communities between sustaining areas and dominant core regions”; Sherratt 1993, 5; for definitions of semi-periphery, see also above, and Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997), and the more remote parts of the Mediterranean were the system’s periphery (e.g., Frankenstein 1979; Sherratt 1993).

The problem with such a reconstruction, tempting as it is, is that it attributes the same status within the system to Judah/Philistia and to Phoenicia. While this is clearly correct from a political perspective, as both regions were subordinated to Assyria (and the more remote parts of the Mediterranean were not), this is clearly a problematic suggestion as far as the economic system is concerned. Here, we have seen that Phoenicia had a much more central role than Philistia (let alone Judah).

One could, of course, suggest different reconstructions of the system. Taking account of the different status of Phoenicia and Philistia, could we suggest that while Assyria was the core, and Phoenicia was indeed a semi-periphery, Philistia and Judah were a periphery?

As far as Assyria was concerned both Phoenicia and Philistia had a similar status, and any attempt to differentiate between them is problematic if viewed from an Assyrian perspective. Moreover, we must acknowledge that in Assyrian eyes Philistia and Judah cannot be ‘relegated’ to the same status as Spain. It is agreed that Iberia (and similar regions) was the periphery of the system (Frankenstein 1979; Sherratt 1993, 39–43). However, although the Assyrians knew about them, it is doubtful if any Assyrian had ever set foot there. Whatever the case, it is clear that Iberia had a very different status from that of Philistia and Judah as far as Assyria was concerned.9

This clearly shows the problematic nature of the system(s) discussed, as far as the world-system ‘theory’ is concerned. Admittedly, views of the world-system theory, along with corrections and modifications are so numerous (see in addition to the works of Chase-Dunn and Hall already mentioned, Peregrine 1996, 3–6), that nobody can really do justice to them in an article; criticism of one element of the theory might be responded to by a different view.10 But we think that the problem of the different status of Phoenicia and Judah/Philistia in the Mediterranean world-system described above, while both had a similar status as far as Assyria was concerned, should be addressed.

We should note, therefore, that there is a difference between an economic system and a political one (see also Peregrine 1996, 2). As Sherratt (1993, 48, note 5) noted “(i)n a crude economic definition, the Levant forms part of a core zone, although often dominated politically by Egypt and Mesopotamia and (on a logical extension of Wallerstein’s definition) acting as a semi-periphery for them”. Despite Tyre’s political subordination to the Mesopotamian superpower during much of the period, Phoenicia was indeed an economic core of the Mediterranean world-system.

We shall return to this point below, but we must reiterate that although it is impossible to do justice to the world-system theory, and with many reservations, it seems to us that the attempts to fit the relations, political and economic, between Assyria, Phoenicia, Philistia and Judah into one model seem to us difficult and to some extent forced upon the data. As Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997, 2) wrote: “(w)e are not attempting to rewrite the history of the world. Rather, we are building a general model that we – and, we hope, others – may use to reexamine the history of the world”. We think this is a better way to use the detailed data available from Israel in particular and the Mediterranean in general, i.e. use the data to build a model which can help in understanding history. We think it is better to understand the system as it functioned in the past (with the help of a world-system perspective whenever possible), and only afterwards to try to understand how it fits into the world-system theory, and how the latter helps in understanding the studied system itself; and perhaps, the ‘system’ itself, as reconstructed here, might help us in understanding the world-system approach and to improve the theory.

Discussion: Assyria and the Mediterranean World-System – part 2

What was, then, Assyria’s economic role in the creation of the system? Was it not the persistent demands for more tribute that pressed the Phoenicians and drove them to explore deeper into the Mediterranean, and beyond (as suggested, e.g., by Frankenstein 1979; see above) if so, is it not still justified to view Assyria as the ‘core’ – after all this is
where the silver and other commodities arrived eventually. We have seen that such a suggestion is wrong on a factual basis (i.e. the Phoenician commercial activity in the west started long before the Assyrian pressure was felt), but even on a conceptual basis we find this idea very problematic.

We are aware that we might be overstating our case, but it seems to us that Assyria is something like a bully who comes to prospering stores, demanding ‘protection’ money. The large sums this bully takes force the owners to work harder in order that the store may still be profitable and to maintain their standard of living, and it is possible that they will look for new customers. But can we call this bully the ‘core’ of system because he is ‘politically’ or ‘militarily’ superior to the store owners? Can we credit his ‘demands’ with being the driving force behind the development of the economy? We think not.

Furthermore, as far the world system is concerned it seems that the Mediterranean became a world system in its own right, and not as a periphery of Assyria. Although politically Tyre was subordinated to Assyria, the Mediterranean had a life beyond that. The Assyrians received their tribute, and benefited from Tyre’s trade and (unintentionally) created conditions where production in some regions prospered (i.e. they helped the production of oil in Ekon by destroying previous centres in the Galilee and Samaria and also by the relative peaceful era), but the economic system that evolved was not their creation.

Figure 15.2 shows the Mediterranean trade in the seventh century BCE, and is taken from Sherratt and Sherratt’s (1993) discussion of the development of Mediterranean trade in the early first millennium BCE. Although they acknowledge the importance of Assyria for the system (Sherratt and Sherratt 1993, 366, 370), we find the map to be very illustrative of the system at large. Assyria is, after all, outside the map…

The system discussed was an economic, and not a political, system, and it is likely that the distinction is important (cf. Peregrine 1996, 2). There is no doubt that Tyre was politically and militarily subordinated to Assyria, and paid tribute (‘protection’) to the latter, but it still was the core of an evolving economic system (which, as such, had to a large extent no direct relation to Assyria). The new economic system was very powerful and had its own ‘life’, which started long before Assyria reached the Mediterranean coast and, moreover, it persisted after Assyria collapsed, and also after the collapse of Babylonia (Assyria’s heir), and even after the collapse of Tyre itself in the sixth century BCE (for the collapse and its implications on the Mediterranean trade system and on the Phoenician colonies, see Aubet 2001, 307, 321, 325, 341–346; Cunliffe and Fernandez Castro 1999, 431; Cunliffe 2001, 275; Ruiz Mata 2002, 192–196; Markoe 2000, 186; Sagona 2004, 259; Gonzalez-Ruibal 2006, 127, and many others).

The system continued to evolve despite all those collapses, and it is this economic system that, if you like, eventually...
transferred the hegemony, from Mesopotamia, thorough Phoenicia, westward to Greece, Carthage, and finally Rome (cf. Sherratt and Sherratt 1993, 363) – to a new economic and political core.

Notes

1 The first half of this paper is based on an article that was published in the Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research (Faust and Weiss 2005). The discussion in this part of the paper has been updated, but is much shorter than in the original article, and readers are therefore referred to the article for a more detailed discussion.

2 When examining the weeds that were found with the wheat, Weiss and Kislev (2004) noticed that in one pile, at least, those could have originated only from Judah.

3 It should be noted that grain surpluses can be produced in various regions of the Negev, and even in the Uvda valley (with an annual average of 24 mm of rain: Avner 2007, 11) primitive flood irrigation in good years supplied the local Bedouins with enough surpluses not only for the intervening years, but also for sale (Avner 2007, 18–19). It is worth noting that Bedouin agriculture was less sophisticated than that of antiquity (Avner 2007, 19; Bruins 2003).

4 It is possible that even southern Transjordan was influenced and became part of the system, but discussion of this region lies beyond the scope of the present paper.

5 Finkelstein and Ussishkin (2000, 602) added that “The north may have been pivotal in the Assyrian administration in Palestine, but it seems to have played only a secondary role in the thriving international trade of the 7th century B.C.E.” This clearly shows that the Assyrians were not responsible for the prosperity that took place outside their provinces.

6 Still, there are big differences between Judah and Philistia and other regions, e.g. Iberia, as the former were much more advanced politically and economically than the latter and, from a political perspective, they were of a similar status to that of Phoenicia. See more below.

7 Some have suggested that Phoenicia was annexed by the Assyrians because the latter realized that it was better for their interests to let the Phoenician system continue uninterruptedly (e.g. Frankenstein 1979, 286; Van de Mieroop 2007, 252; see also Elat 1978, 34).

8 We do not wish to discuss the status of each polity in relation to Assyria, and whether it became a province for some time or not (cf. Na’an’am 2001, and many others). As a whole, the regions discussed here were semi-independent during the seventh century (e.g. Tadmor 1966, 87; 2006, 253; Ephal 1979, 86).

9 It should be stressed that one cannot relegate Iberia to the role of margin in the seventh century. While this will enable us to differentiate between this region and Philistia, and between the latter and Phoenicia, it runs against the common definitions of margins (above). Furthermore, the reality in seventh century Spain is in line with the common definition of periphery, and the societies in the region “underwent structural transformations as a result of regular exchanges of material products with privileged consumers elsewhere” (Sherratt 1993, 5; for the reality in Spain and the social changes that took place at the time, see for example Aubet 2001; Delgado and Ferrer 2007; and various articles in Bierling 2002, and references; for agricultural and economic influences, see also Buxó 2008).

10 Thus, for example, according to the classical definitions of core and periphery (Wallerstein 1974), neither Phoenicia nor Assyria can be regarded as a core, since both had only two of the necessary attributes (see also Peregrine 1996, 3–4, and above): Assyria did not “produce items for trade using skilled labour and sophisticated technology” (Assyria received what it needed through taxes, tribute or by taking booties, and did not usually send products in return), while Phoenicia did not have “a strong political organization” (the definitions from Peregrine 1996, 3). Similarly it is difficult to see how Tyre fulfilled the requirements of a semi-periphery, as it did not act as “a political buffer-zone, limiting conflicts between the core and the periphery and effectively obscuring the nature of the core’s domination” (Peregrine 1996, 4). Nor did it “produce some items using older technology imported from the core” (ibid.), and even the view of it as “middleman” “in trade between the core and the periphery” (ibid.) can be questioned (as Assyria did not really participate in the trade itself). Still, because Wallerstein’s views have been corrected and modified so many times (above, see also, for example, Hall and Chase-Dunn 1996: 15 and references, for an example in which even the most basic relations between core and peripheries are reversed), criticism of any element in one ‘theory’, can be answered by another theory. The question is whether we have a theory that can account for all the data, and it seems as if this is not yet accomplished.

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